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 
Abstract— The quality and reliability of safety critical 
software systems are highly dependent on proper system 
validation and verification.  In model-driven software 
development, semi-formal notations are often used in 
requirements capture.  Though semi-formal notations possess 
advantages, their major disadvantage is their imprecision.  A 
technique to eliminate imprecision is to transform semi-formal 
models into an analyzable representation using formal 
specification techniques (FSTs).  With this approach to system 
validation and verification, safety critical systems can be 
developed more reliably.  This work documents early experience 
of applying FSTs on UML class diagrams as attribute 
constraints, and pre- post-conditions on procedures.  The 
validation and verification of the requirements of a system to 
monitor unmanned aerial vehicles in unrestricted airspace is the 
origin of this work.  The challenge is the development of a system 
with incomplete specifications; multiple conflicting stakeholders’ 
interests; existence of a prototype system; the need for 
standardized compliance, where validation and verification are 
paramount, which necessitates forward and reverse engineering 
activities. 
 
Index Terms— model transformation; formal specification 
techniques; requirements engineering 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N history, the uses of UAS technologies lie at the core of 
military operations such as surveillance, target identification 
and designation, mine detection, and reconnaissance [1]. 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) technologies are 
categorized as safety critical systems.  This is due to their 
being employed in high-risk tasks that require rigorous 
development methodologies to assure its integrity.  A system 
that is defined as safety critical can have serious ramifications 
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if a fault occurs.  These implications include the risk of injury, 
loss of life, data, and property.  Therefore, designing these 
systems require: 1) thorough understanding of their 
requirements, 2) precise and unambiguous specifications, and 
3) metrics to verify and validate the quality of software 
produced.  Safety critical aviation systems must adhere to 
standards such as the United States RTCA DO-178B [16] to 
foster its acceptance by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA)  and other interested parties.  The DO-178B focuses on 
all aspects of round trip software engineering and 
requirements based testing as key elements of software 
verification to uncover errors [9]. 
The University of North Dakota (UND) – UAS Risk 
Mitigation Project was awarded a contract to develop a proof-
of-concept air truth system, which monitors the operation of 
UAVs in the US National Airspace.  The project started with 
minimal requirements.  This resulted in the rapid development 
of a prototype to assist in exploring and developing additional 
requirements.  
The Unified Modeling Language (UML), developed in the 
early 1990s, is the ISO standard for designing and 
conceptualizing graphical models of software systems [2].  
Graphical software models, such as UML models, possess 
simplistic designs and promote good software engineering 
practices.  However, they are not without flaw as they are 
often imprecise and ambiguous.  In addition, they are not 
directly analyzable by type checkers and proof tools.  This 
makes it difficult to evaluate the integrity and correctness of 
graphical software models. 
Formal Specification Techniques have been advocated as a 
supplementary approach to amend the informality of graphical 
software models [3] [4].  They promote the design of 
mathematically tractable systems through critical thinking and 
scientific reasoning.  FSTs use a specification language, such 
as Z notation, to describe the components of a system and 
their constraints [8].  Unlike graphical models, formal models 
can be analyzed directly by a proof tool.  Detractors of FSTs 
claim, they increase the cost of development, require highly 
trained mathematicians, and are not used in real systems [5].  
However, they have been used in case studies which unveiled 
that, FSTs facilitate a greater understanding of the 
requirements and their feasibility [6] [7] [13].  Although the 
use of FSTs is sometimes controversial, their benefits to 
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critical systems offset the disadvantages. 
In the traditional approach to software engineering, 
graphical models would precede code generation.  However, it 
is common for a prototype to preexist.  In such scenarios, 
reverse engineering activities are used to derive the graphical 
models.  This approach was undertaken in this research; along 
with forward engineering tactics, which ensured the derived 
models were abstract and susceptible to evolution.  
II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
An obstacle to field-testing of UAS is integrating their 
flight with manned aerial vehicles (MAV) in national air 
spaces (NAS).  In order for this integration to be possible 
there is the requirement for a system that ensures the 
possibility of a mid-air collision or near-collision is the same 
as or better than that which now exists for MAVs operation 
[1].  Towards this goal the UND – UAS Risk Mitigation 
Project was started.  This project will provide support to UAV 
experimentation and training, and defense assistance to 
civilian authorities.  
The UND – UAS Risk Mitigation Project architecture is 
composed of three main components: a radar system, a data 
computation unit, and a display system.  The display system 
software is the focus of the work presented herein.  The 
project had a strict deadline for a series of deliverables over an 
initial one-year Phase 1 timeframe, and successful completion 
of the first phase would result in a subsequent two-year Phase 
2 timeframe for the project.  At the heart of Phase 1 efforts 
was the development of the system architecture, and the 
agents assigned to the architectural components.  The 
development of a prototype display system was stated at the 
outset, with the intent of identifying the requirements of the 
proposed project.  This report documents the effort and initial 
results of the system validation and verification effort, and its 
relationship to the system requirements specification.  Work 
on the system requirements specification, and validation and 
verification is being conducted by the same project sub-team. 
A project sub-team made significant progress with the 
development of the display system, which was viewed as the 
core of the project, from the point of demonstrating to the 
various stakeholders the viability of a system to monitor 
airspace and facilitate safe operation of both MAVs and 
UAVs.  Consequently the validation and verification team 
were forced into conducting both forward and reverse 
engineering activities at an early stage in the project life cycle.  
The diagram below captures the dual-approach software 
engineering being carried out on the project. 
Fig. 1 outlines the concurrent approaches in use on the 
project, for formally verifying and validating the software 
system, specifically for the display component.  The solid 
arrow lines of Fig. 1 depict the forward engineering path of 
the process.  A set of graphical design models (in this case 
UML class diagram [2]) are developed beginning with the 
system specification.  The graphical models are transformed 
into a formal specification (in this case the Z notation [8]) 
representation for analysis.  From the formal analysis, the 
decision is made whether to modify the graphical models or 
proceed with code generation from the models, based on the 
presence or absence of identifiable errors.  The dotted arrow 
lines of Fig. 1 depict the reverse engineering part of the 
process.  This begins with reverse engineering of the graphical 
design model (in this case UML class diagram), from the 
source code (in this case the display system).  Once the 
models have been recovered from the code, the process 
follows the path of the forward engineering steps.  The 
exception is that code is not generated, but modified (as it 
already exists); this is depicted by the dashed arrow line from 
“Error Reported” to “Program Code”.  The aspects of the 
work documented in this report are, the formalization steps 
defined to transform the graphical models into the formal 
specification notation, and the early lessons learnt in carrying 
out the work. 
Figure 1. Forward/Reverse Engineering for System V & V 
III. BACKGROUND 
The focus of Model Driven Engineering (MDE) is to 
transform, refine, and integrate models into the software 
development life cycle to support system design, evolution, 
and maintenance [12].  Models serve many purposes and their 
use varies from stakeholder to stakeholder.  The purpose of 
modeling, from a developer’s standpoint, is to represent the 
proposed system. Models should be a coherent, cohesive, and 
abstract means of showing how the proposed system will 
address the user’s needs.  They can be derived through 
forward or reverse engineering.  Forward engineering is the 
process of moving from high-level abstractions and 
implementation independent designs to the implementation of 
a system [11]; while reverse engineering is the process of 
recovering design decisions, abstractions, and rationale from a 
source code [10]. 
The UML is an object-oriented modeling language for 
specifying, visualizing, constructing, and documenting the 
artifacts of software systems [2].  Diagrams in UML are 
categorized as structure or behavior diagrams.  Structure 
diagrams represent the static framework of the system, 
whereas behavior diagrams depict the dynamic features of the 
system.  These informal models have an advantage of being 
expressive – which makes them easily conveyed to both 
technical and nontechnical stakeholders.  However, UML 
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lacks precise semantics, which results in its models being 
subject to multiple interpretations.  This is exacerbated by the 
use of natural language annotations – as a means of 
clarification and explanation of the modeling techniques 
adopted. 
Formal specification has been in existence decades before 
the inception of UML, and employs mathematical concepts 
and principles to describe software models with precision 
through rigorous analysis [3].  Employing FSTs is not a 
substitute for graphical software models; they are 
complementary.  While formal models reveal inconsistencies 
and omissions, the informal model is an explicable version of 
the formal models [13].  The specification language chosen in 
this work is Z notation.  A specification written in Z notation 
models the proposed system by naming the components of the 
system and expressing constraints between those components 
[8].  Its formal basis enables mathematical reasoning, and 
hence proves that desired properties are consequences of the 
specification [8].  From these proofs, one can prove the 
specification is accurate and complete. 
System behavior should always be deterministic in the 
domain of safety critical systems.  These software systems 
encompass numerous highly complex processing components 
and have high demands for reliability and accuracy.  Due to 
the continuous use of UML in software development, there is 
a need to resolve the informal semantics of the models it 
produces [6].  Transforming UML models into Z equivalences 
also provide formal analysis to accomplish validation and 
verification of software systems. 
IV. TRANSFORMATION METHODOLOGY 
A. Deriving Graphical Models 
The prototype of the air truth system was designed using 
C++.  There are many software tools, which have the 
functionality of reverse engineering graphical software models 
from source code; however, there is a sizable semantic gap 
between UML and C++ [10].  Therefore, these tools often 
derive differing abstract representations of the same source 
code.  Consequently, the use of an automated tool to assist in 
deriving abstract representations of the safety critical system 
was deemed inappropriate; since many of these tools were 
closed source and one cannot understand or influence how 
these tools interprets the prototype.  Given that the DO-178B 
is process oriented, one needs to have an existing 
methodology, or familiarity with the workings of any 
intermediary software, to establish compliance. 
B. Identifying Classes, Attributes, and Operations 
The UML class diagram is a graph of classifier elements 
connected by their various static relationships [2].  In C++, 
classes are usually preceded by the keyword “struct” or 
“class” and followed by a class name and delimiters.  The 
declarations of attributes are preceded by its data type 
followed by the attribute’s name.  To define attributes in 
UML, their respective data types were replaced with data 
types that were platform independent.  An alternative means 
of identifying attributes is from the collection of accessors and 
mutators [10].  An accessor is a function that returns a copy of 
a member variable without modifying its value, whereas a 
mutator is a function that modifies the value of member 
variables.  Since accessors and mutators are not always 
present in the declaration of classes, this method was used to 
reinforce that certain variables are, in fact, members of the 
class. 
Defining operation signatures in UML was synonymous to 
their declaration in C++.  The difference be is that platform 
independent data types were used and all parameters were 
stripped of pointer references and array tokens.  The source 
code in Table 1 is a simplified example that will be used to 
demonstrate the process of deriving a UML class diagram.  
From this source code, four classes were identified: Aircraft, 
MAV, UAV, and Coordinate.  If a class referenced another 
class, e.g. the Aircraft class referenced the Coordinate class; 
this was not represented as an attribute of the class.  Both 
Aircraft and Coordinate had methods and they were declared 
in their respective classes in the appropriate sections. 




 string call_sign; 
 integer roll; 
 integer air_speed; 
 integer heading; 
 Coordinate coordinate; 
 void print(); 
};  
class MAV : public 
Aircraft 
{ 
 string MAV_ID; 
 string MAV_class; 
};  
class UAV : public 
Aircraft 
{ 
 string UAV_ID; 




 double longitude; 
 double latitude; 






C. Identifying Binary Class Relationships 
A binary relationship is an association that connects exactly 
two classifiers [2].  In UML, associations can be of three 
different kinds: 1) ordinary associations, 2) composite 
aggregate and 3) sharable aggregate [2].  C++ associations are 
identified as member variables, which reference another UML 
class [10].  An example of this was represented when the 
Aircraft class referenced the coordinate class.  Distinguishing 
between general associations and aggregations was difficult.  
Research has shown that the weak form of aggregation is 
structurally equivalent to a general association between the 
two classes [10] [14].  Therefore, domain knowledge was used 
to determine whether a general association or aggregation is 
suitable. 
D. Identifying Inheritance 
UML represents inheritance through the 
generalization/specialization hierarchy.  C++ clearly 
represents this in the declaration of each class generalizable 
class – where a sub-class declaration contains the signature of 
the super-class from which it inherits.  In Figure 2, both MAV 
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and UAV classes are sub-classes of Aircraft. 
 
Figure 2. Reengineered UML Class Diagram 
E. Identifying Multiplicities 
A multiplicity is a specification of integer intervals; where 
an interval represents a range of integers, in the format: lower-
bound..upper-bound [2].  Identifying multiplicities, in the 
source code, was one of the most challenging aspects of this 
work.  According to [10], only three types of multiplicities can 
be unambiguously identified from C++ source code: 1) only a 
single instance of a class is declared, 2) a reference to a single 
instance is declared, and 3) a fixed size array is declared.  
Other cases may result in inaccurate upper and lower bounds 
and requires further knowledge of the problem domain.  From 
domain knowledge, an aircraft can be associated with one or 
more coordinates throughout its lifetime – since each aircraft 
will have a path from its origin to its destination.  Focus was 
on the fact that an aircraft, at a given point in time, must have 
at most one coordinate; and a coordinate is associated with 
zero or one aircraft.  Fig. 2 also shows the multiplicity that 
was derived from the source code. 
F. Transforming Graphical Models to Formal Models 
There is a plethora of literature on transforming UML class 
diagrams using FSTs.  However, the disparity between these 
works does not advocate a strict methodology that is 
appropriate for automation.  This work amalgamates the 
works of J. Anthony Hall and Robert France to define a strict 
set of sequential rules that will yield correct formal models.  
After the UML models were designed, the attributes, 
operations, and relationships of each class were analyzed 
separately.  This analysis highlighted patterns, which appeared 
standard throughout the manual transformation of the UML 
models.  From these patterns, a set of rules were defined that 
should yield representative formal models from their graphical 
counterpart – provided the graphical models are well-formed 
UML models.  Some of the set of rules is as follows: 
1. Declaration of Basic Types, Composite Types and Global 
Variables: Data types in Z are often referred to as basic 
types or given sets of the specification.  A feature of 
the Z notation is that it offers a calculus for building 
large specifications from smaller components [4] – and 
basic types facilitate this.  Currently, identifying basic 
types for a Z specification is a manual task.  The 
software engineer must examine the attributes of each 
UML class to identify data types, which do not have an 
equivalent representation in the Z mathematical toolkit.  
To automate this process, an operation defined as a 
‘Basic Type Parse’ can be performed on each UML 
class.  This process will scan the attributes of each 
class to identify any data types that are not present in 
the Z Mathematical Toolkit.  The data types identified 
can be declared as basic types.  The result of a basic 
type parse on Figure 2 will return two new basic types 
– [STRING] and [DOUBLE]. 
2. Establishing Data Types for the Object Identity of each Z 
Schema: The creation and manipulation of objects are 
essential in the object-oriented paradigm.  A class 
along with its respective attributes and operations 
embodies an object.  Its framework may remain the 
same; however, its state will change.  To account for 
this, each Z schema will have a property called an 
object identifier.  An object’s identifier makes it unique 
and distinguishes it from all other objects within the 
system [4].  A basic type will be declared to represent 
the object identifier of each UML class.  This step only 
seeks to establish the basic types.  Applying this step to 
Figure 2 will produce the following: [AIRCRAFT] 
[COORDINATE] [MAV] [UAV]. 
3. Define Attribute Schemata: Each UML class may contain 
zero or more attributes and an arbitrary number of 
operations.  Therefore, two cases arise: 
Case 1:- UML classes with zero attributes and one 
or more operations.  In case 1, the definition of an 
attribute schema is unnecessary.  However since there 
are operations performed by the class; proceed to the 
subsequent step – declaration of the class schema.  In 
the event that no attributes or operations are defined in 
the UML class, a representative Z schema would be 
invalid and rejected by Z/EVES. 
Case 2:- UML classes with one or more attributes 
and zero or more operations.  The attributes of each 
class will be declared in its attribute schema.  A UML 
class can be described in terms of its intension and 
extension.  The intension defines attributes and 
constraints on the class; whereas the extension 
describes characteristics that instances of the class 
should have in common [2].  To obtain the attributes 
and their respective initialized values, each class will 
be subject to an ‘Intension Parse’.  This task is 
performed sequentially on each attribute of the UML 
class, in two stages, to identify: 1) the attribute’s name 
and data type; and 2) values, which initialize or 
constrain the attribute.  In the initial phase, there needs 
to be a one-to-one mapping between the attribute and 
one of the previously defined basic types or a data type 
present in the Z mathematical toolkit.  The second 
phase will identify attributes and their respective 
initialized values.  This will be declared in the 
schema’s predicate part. 
Two categories of constraints were identified in this 
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work: 
• Domain-specific constraints: - these constraints are based 
on the problem domain e.g., headings are values 
between 0 and 360 degrees.  These constraints cannot 
and will not change irrespective of the system being 
designed. 
• Operational constraints: - these are constraints that are 
imposed on the system’s operation; e.g., an aircraft’s 
air speed should not exceed 250 knots.  Even though 
these values can be exceeded, in the current system, if 
that occurs it should be flagged as erroneous.  
Domain constraints will be defined in the class schema 
and system constraints will be defined in the attribute 
schema. 
4. Define Class Schemata: This step focuses on the 
extension of UML classes.  It is not mandatory to 
separate the definition of the attribute and class 
schemata; however, combining them may result in a 
cumbersome schema.  In addition, information hiding 
allows one to focus on what is relevant to the extension 
and intension of a class.  A schema will be created with 
the name of each UML class, which will comprise of 
its attribute schema – via schema inclusion.  Schema 
inclusion does not link the schemata; it only permits 
direct access to the contents of the included schema.  
Therefore, a variable will be created which binds the 
attribute schema to its class schema.  The schema 
binding is represented as a partial function – which 
maps the schema’s given set to the attribute schema. 
The final step in the definition of the class schema is to 
establish a relationship between the object’s identifier and the 
attributes of the class.  This is represented in the schema’s 
predicate part and states that object identifiers are associated 
with data items – i.e. the attributes.  The naming convention 
for the class schemata is the UML class name followed by the 
keyword ‘classifier’. 
5. Define Identity Schema: The definition of this schema 
will reinforce that an object identifier cannot change.  
To capture this, an operation schema will be defined 
which will indicate that any change in an object’s state 
should not affect its identifier.   
6. Define Relationship Schemata: A relationship schema 
defines the types of relationships that exist between 
classes.  It also depicts the number of object 
instantiations that are permissible for each class; these 
are represented by their respective multiplicities.  
Binary relationships and hierarchies are the focus of 
this work.  
7. Define Parameter Schemata: This step will be conducted 
only if an operation accepts parameters.  When creating 
these schemata, each data item in the parameter list of 
an operation is defined in a similar manner as the 
definition of class attributes.  Each parameter will be 
identified by its name and corresponding data type, 
mapping each parameter name to a Z data type or a 
basic type, which was previously defined.  The naming 
convention used for parameter schemata is the name of 
the class followed by the name of the method and the 
keyword ‘parameters’. 
8. Define Operation Schemata: Schema inclusion is 
exploited when creating operation schemata.  It is used 
in the case where an operation has parameters – the 
corresponding parameter schema for an operation is 
included in the operation schema definition.  Key 
notational conventions are used in operation schemata 
definition.  They denote if the execution of a particular 
operation changes the state of the system.  These 
respective notations will be included in the operation 
schema declaration part, followed by the name of the 
class schema which the operation execution has 
produced some change.  In addition, if other variables 
are defined locally within an operation they will be 
declared as well.  All constraints existing on variables 
and/or parameter values will be defined in the schema’s 
predicate part.  Most importantly, the pre – and post-
conditions of operation safe execution is specified in 
these schemata.  
9. Define a configuration schema: This schema will entail 
all the previously defined relationship schemata, along 
with the operation schemata. 
Table 2 presents a portion of the schemata that were 
developed from conducting the formalization technique 
outlined above, on the class diagram of Fig. 2.  
Aircraft_Classifier, Coordinate_Classifier and Aircraft_print 
are two classes and one method, respectively, from Fig. 2. 
V. I. RESULTS 
At the project end, the requirement specification (forward 
engineering) activities have been through a number of 
refinement iterations.  The reverse engineering activities have 
resulted in the manual development of a UML class diagram 
of the display system, as the first component to be reverse 
engineered.  This class diagram is composed of 174 classes, 
including user-defined types, enumerations, and header file 
functions.  There are over 2,250 attributes across these classes, 
which are linked by 383 associations 
(generalizations/specializations, aggregations, compositions, 
and regular associations).  The model includes over 580 
operations (methods) that specify 268 parameters. 
In this paper, formal methods were applied on a simplified 
example to demonstrate the transformation process.  The 
methodology was applied to the class diagram of component 
from the UAS Risk Mitigation System.  The class diagram for 
this component contained 9 classes with a combined total of 
455 attributes, 16 associations (including hierarchical 
relationships) and their respective multiplicities.  There were a 
total of 56 operations that were analyzed; as well as the pre- 
and post-conditions of their respective 63 local variables and 
28 parameters were evaluated.  This derived 206 paragraphs in 
Z/EVES, which included the declaration of schemata, basic 
types, and axiomatic definitions.  Some errors which were 
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discovered included:  improper use of data types to handle 
data of a certain nature (for example, using strings to store 
numerical values that may be used in calculations), 
inconsistent data type declarations of similar variables, 
improper variable assignments and storage across functions, 
parameter/attribute conflicts, among other errors that are not 
detected in typical software testing. 





ÆMAV: P AIRCRAFT 
ÆUAV: P AIRCRAFT 
«_______________ 
ÆMAV U UAV z AIRCRAFT 
»_Aircraft_Attributes________________ 
Æcall_sign: STRING 
Æroll: P N 
Æair_speed: P N 
Æheading: P N 
«_______________ 




Æaircraft_instances: P AIRCRAFT 
Æaircraft_attributes: AIRCRAFT ß Aircraft_Attributes 
«_______________ 
Ædom aircraft_attributes = aircraft_instances 
Æheading = 0 .. 360 











ÆA a: air_speed • a Î 0 




Æcoordinate_instances: P COORDINATE 
Æcoordinate_attributes: COORDINATE ß Coordinate_Attributes 
«_______________ 
Ædom coordinate_attributes = coordinate_instances 
Ælongitude = - 180 .. 180 
Ælatitude = - 90 .. 90 
The application of the steps, outlined in the methodology, 
enlightened us on pragmatic approaches to applying formal 
methods in the validation and verification of other 
components in the project.  The work effort, however, was 
very tedious which resulted in sporadic human errors in the 
specification.  Consequently, there is need for a tool to support 
and simplify the formalization process.  This will alleviate the 
workload, as well as reduce the possibility of human errors in 
the specification. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Safety critical systems must adhere to stringent guidelines 
on validation and verification.  As a result, the work 
documented in this report entails preliminary results and 
experience in conducting system validation and verification, 
via a formal specification technique.  Due to the popularity 
and the standardized use of graphical software modeling, 
UML notation was for this system. The Z notation was 
selected for formal system representation and analysis because 
of the experience of the developers with this notation, and the 
availability of open source support tools. 
Experience gained on this project has reassured the 
importance and benefits of FSTs to software development. 
The process identified numerous errors in the system, which 
was not detected during testing.  These included design 
anomalies that were also identified. A deeper understanding of 
the system which FSTs forced the developers to attain as 
discussed in [13], drove the discovery of these latent errors. 
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